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1 Decreto legislativo 82/2005 del 7 marzo 2005 (in
G.U. n. 112 del 16 maggio 2005) entrata in vigore 1
gennaio 2006, (Legislative Decree 82/2005 of
March 7th 2005 (in Official Journal no. 112 of March
16th 2005) entered into force January 1st 2006.
2 Disposizioni integrative e correttive al decreto
legislativo 7 marzo 2005, n. 82, recante codice
dell’amministrazione digitale (GU n. 99 del 29
aprile 2006 - Suppl. Ordinario n.105) (Legislative
Decree No 159 of 4 April 2006, published in the
Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana N. 99 of
29 April 2006).
3 An animated feature film based on the Asterix
comic book series, with the screenplay written by
Pierre Tchernia.
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On 16 March 2005, the Official Journal of the Italian
Republic (Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica
Italiana) published the new ‘Codice
Dell’Amministrazione Digitale’ ‘Code for the digital
administration’.1 Unusually, it was decided to
enable the Code to be amended, and although not
very common with Italian legislation, it was duly
amended by Decreto Legislativo 4 aprile 2006, n.
159 (Dlgs 159/2006),2 leading to its current version.
The new Code has altered the Italian legal
framework significantly. The changes are outlined
in this article.
An outline of the main provisions of 
the Code 
Those used to dealing with the Italian Public
Administration will find this Code refreshing. The
provisions set out in article 3(1) are significant:
‘1. I cittadini e le imprese hanno diritto a richiedere
ed ottenere l’uso delle tecnologie telematiche nelle
comunicazioni con le pubbliche amministrazioni e
con i gestori di pubblici servizi statali nei limiti di
quanto previsto nel presente codice.’
‘1. Citizens and companies have the right to request
and obtain the adoption of information technologies
in their communications with public administrations
and with national utility providers within the limits
laid down by the present code.’
Not only citizens and companies have the right to
‘request’, but, and this is the significant point, also to
‘obtain’ the adoption of information technologies in
their communications with public administrations, both
locally and nationally. The fans of René Goscinni and
Albert Uderzo of Asterix may be aware that one of ‘The
Twelve Tasks of Asterix’ (Les Douze travaux d’Astérix)3
was to go through the ‘The Place That Sends You Mad’
‘Maison de la Folie administrative’ mentally unscathed.
This is where citizens were sent from one counter to the
next just to withdraw papers to be submitted to the first
one, to be sent to a third counter, and so on. Asterix
finally succeeds by asking for an imaginary permit that
nobody is aware of, causing pandemonium, and he is
eventually given Permit A-38 to make him leave and
stop causing trouble. The Code may end this incredible
nightmare in Italy.
Unfortunately, the subsequent subsection to article
3(1) acts to limit the provisions of the Code:
‘1bis. Il principio di cui al comma 1 si applica alle
amministrazioni regionali e locali nei limiti delle
risorse tecnologiche ed organizzative disponibili e nel
rispetto della loro autonomia normativa.’
‘The principle asserted in paragraph 1 applies to
regional and local administrations within the limits of
their available technological resources’.
This means that the central administration is bound by
this requirement, but local administrations can freely
decide within the bounds of their autonomy if and when
this requirement can be fulfilled.
Article 4 sets out what can be expected of public








‘4. Partecipazione al procedimento amministrativo
informatico.
1. La partecipazione al procedimento amministrativo
e il diritto di accesso ai documenti amministrativi
sono esercitabili mediante l’uso delle tecnologie
dell’informazione e della comunicazione secondo
quanto disposto dagli articoli 59 e 60 del decreto del
Presidente della Repubblica 28 dicembre 2000, n.
445.
2. Ogni atto e documento può essere trasmesso alle
pubbliche amministrazioni con l’uso delle tecnologie
dell’informazione e della comunicazione se formato
ed inviato nel rispetto della vigente normativa.’
Paragraph 1 states that citizens can exert the right to
participate in the administrative proceedings and to
obtain access to administrative documents through ICT
technology (each administration will define which terms
for this usage are relevant to its own needs), and
paragraph 2 states that any act or document can be
transmitted to public administrations through ICT
technologies, provided the document is compliant with
the rules in force.
The provisions of the Code reinforce the rights and
powers that are relevant to the ‘Protocollo informatico’
(‘electronic document register’),4 by which public
administrators must record each and all the documents
received from outside or sent from within the
organization. The Protocollo Informatico complements
the ability of people to obtain access to public
documents in accordance with the data protection rules.
The requirements of the Protocollo informatico fits well
within the provisions of article 4(1) regarding the
establishment of electronic dossiers by public
administrations. Now ‘duly’ authorised persons, even
from outside the administration, will be able to obtain
secure access to both the Protocollo and the dossiers to
ascertain the status of a specific proceeding.
The provisions of article 38 represent a further
advance: it is possible to implement electronic fund
transfers between public administrations and members
of the public, provided that the technical rules, to be
specified in a subsequent Decree, are met. Article 5
requires central public administrations to be in a
position to make electronic payments possible from 30
June 2007.
Article 6 provides that central public administrations,
and, where not differently provided for, local
administrations, are required to make use of the
‘registered electronic mail’ (Posta Elettronica Certificata)
for each and every exchange of documents and
information with anyone who requests this type of
exchange. This means that if a legal or natural person
demands the exchange documents with a specific
administration via registered e-mail, the administration
is required to use registered e-mail.5 However, the
proposed changes are subject to a subtle provision in
article 40(1):
‘1. Le pubbliche amministrazioni che dispongono di
idonee risorse tecnologiche formano gli originali dei
propri documenti con mezzi informatici secondo le
disposizioni di cui al presente codice e le regole
tecniche di cui all’articolo 71.’
4 The Protocollo Informatico is governed by the
Decreto Del Presidente Della Repubblica 28
dicembre 2000, n. 445 Disposizioni legislative in
materia di documentazione amministrativa. (Testo
A) (pubblicato nella Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 42 del 20
febbraio 2001- Supplemento ordinario n. 30)
(Decree by the President of the Republic No 445 of
28/12/2000), that absorbed the Decreto Del
Presidente Della Repubblica No. 428/1998 Regole
tecniche per il protocollo informatico di cui al DPR
20 ottobre 1998, n. 428 (Decree by the President of
the Republic No 428 of 20 October 1998), and by
the implementation rules of law Decreto PCM del
31/12/2000: Regole tecniche per il protocollo
informatico di cui al DPR 20/10/1998 n.428
Circolare AIPA del 7/5/2001 di cui all.art. 18, comma
2, del DPCM (Decree by the President of the
Council of Ministers – DPCM – of 31/10/2000, AIPA
Circular Letter AIPA/CR No 28 of 7 May 2001).
5 The Technical Committee ‘Electronic Signatures
and Infrastructures’ of the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) is
developing through its Specialised Task Force
(STF) 318 a set of Technical Specifications with the
purpose of providing a set of standards for
Registered E-Mail. These Specifications are
expected to be published in the second half of
2008.
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‘1. Public administrations that have adequate
technological resources shall form the original copies
of their documents using information technology
according to the provisions of this code and the
technical requirements set out in Article 71.’
This provision appears to apply to the preparation of
documents, but everything can be deemed a
‘document’. This means that the provisions of this
paragraph might enable an administration to circumvent
the rules on the basis that it does not have the
necessary technological resources. Article 40(2)
attempts to provide an economic rationale for not
putting too much on paper, and taken in combination
with article 40(3), there is an attempt to ensure that
suitably equipped administrations can keep drafting (or
copying) documents on paper only in cases that will be
addressed by a subsequent Decree. Article 7 requires
the ICT implementation of public administrations to be
monitored by two Ministries each year, the Ministro
delegato per la funzione pubblica and the Ministro
delegato per l’innovazione e le tecnologie.
Electronic signature 
Although the Code does not refer to the advanced
electronic signature, it has retained the term ‘digital
signature’ as a legacy from the previous law. The ‘digital
signature’ is not referred to in the Code as the basic
cryptographic mechanism, but it means a Qualified
Electronic Signature based on asymmetric cryptography.
This means the Code now refers to the electronic
signature, the Qualified Electronic Signature and the
digital signature. This implies that, whenever an
advanced electronic signature is required, it is
necessary to ‘re-invent’ it again, by calling it a different
name and assigning it the same characteristics as
provided for in article 2(2) of the Directive.6
The legal effectiveness of Qualified Electronic
Signatures
The previous law, now having been replaced by the
Code, was extensively covered by Dr Luigi Martin and Dr
Roberto Pascarelli,7 so the differences need to be
considered. The previous Decree, Decreto del
Presidente della Repubblica (DPR) 28 dicembre 2000, n.
445 provided, in article 10(2), as follows:
‘Il documento informatico, sottoscritto con firma
elettronica, soddisfa il requisito legale della forma
scritta. Sul piano probatorio il documento stesso é
liberamente valutabile, tenuto conto delle sue
caratteristiche oggettive di qualità e sicurezza. Esso
inoltre soddisfa l’obbligo previsto dagli articoli 2214
e seguenti del codice civile e da ogni altra analoga
disposizione legislativa o regolamentare.
Il documento informatico, quando è sottoscritto con
firma digitale o con un altro tipo di firma elettronica
avanzata, e la firma è basata su di un certificato
qualificato ed è generata mediante un dispositivo per
la creazione di una firma sicura, fa inoltre piena
prova, fino a querela di falso, della provenienza delle
dichiarazioni da chi l’ha sottoscritto.’
‘The electronic document, when subscribed with an
electronic signature, fulfills the requirement of legal
writing. On the evidence the document itself is freely
evaluated, in view of its objective characteristics of
quality and safety. Furthermore it fulfils the
obligation in accordance with articles 2214 and
subsequent of the civil code and in accordance with
any other legislative or regulatory provision.
The electronic document, when it is signed with a
digital signature or with any other type of advanced
6 Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a
Community framework for electronic signatures, OJ
L 13, 19.01.2000, p.12.
7 Dr Luigi Martin and Dr Roberto Pascarelli,
‘Electronic signature: value in law and probative
effectiveness in the Italian legal system’, Digital
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 1
(2004) 19 - 24.
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electronic signature, and the signature is based on a
qualified certificate and was generated with a secure
signature creation device, also provides full evidence,
until a complaint of a false signature of the origin of
declarations from the subscriber,
Article 21(2) of the new Code instead makes explicit
reference to article 2702 of the Italian Civil Code:
‘2. Il documento informatico, sottoscritto con firma
digitale o con un altro tipo di firma elettronica
qualificata, ha l’efficacia prevista dall’articolo 2702
del codice civile. L’utilizzo del dispositivo di firma si
presume riconducibile al titolare, salvo che questi dia
la prova contraria.’
‘2. The document, when subscribed with a digital
signature or another type of qualified electronic
signature, is effective as provided for under Article
2702 of the Civil Code. The use of the signing
creation device is presumed as being that of the
owner, unless they give evidence to the contrary.’
Article 2702 of the Civil Code states as follows:
‘La scrittura privata fa piena prova, fino a querela di
falso (Cod. Proc. Civ. 221 e seguenti), della
provenienza delle dichiarazioni da chi l’ha
sottoscritta, se colui contro il quale la scrittura è
prodotta ne riconosce la sottoscrizione, ovvero se
questa e legalmente considerata come riconosciuta
(Cod. Proc. Civ. 214, 215; Cod. Nav. 178, 775).’
‘The private writing gives full evidence, except where
there is a complaint of a false signature (Cod. Proc.
Civ. 221 et seq), of the origin of the declarations of
the person who signed it, if the person whose
signature it is acknowledges the subscription, or if it
is legally considered as recognized (Cod. Proc. Civ.
214, 215; Cod. Nav. 178, 775).’
The Code provides a presumption that when a person
has issued a digital signature or another type of
qualified electronic signature, they are presumed to
have used their own signature creation device, and if
they claim the signature was not affixed by them, they
have to prove they did not affix the signature to the
document. This is reinforced by the provisions of article
20(2), added by article 8 of Dlgs 159/2006, which states
as follows:
‘2. Il documento informatico sottoscritto con firma
elettronica qualificata o con firma digitale, formato
nel rispetto delle regole tecniche stabilite ai sensi
dell’articolo 71, che garantiscano l’identificabilita’
dell’autore, l’integrita’ e l’immodificabilita’ del
documento, si presume riconducibile al titolare del
dispositivo di firma ai sensi dell’articolo 21, comma 2,
e soddisfa comunque il requisito della forma scritta,
anche nei casi previsti, sotto pena di nullita’,
dall’articolo 1350, primo comma, numeri da 1 a 12 del
codice civile.’
‘2. A document signed with qualified electronic
signature or digital signature, formed in compliance
with the technical requirements established under
Article 71, which guarantee the identity of the author,
and the integrity of the document, is assumed to be
ascribed to the holder of the signature creation
device in accordance with Article 21, paragraph 2,
and still meets the requirement of writing, even in
cases provided under penalty of invalidity, by 1350,
the first paragraph numbers from 1 to 12 Civil Code.’
The article of the Civil Code referred to, covers contracts,
acts of waiver, and acts that provide for life annuities,
amongst others. In essence, it appears that all legal acts
regarding the Civil Code can be drafted electronically
and signed with a qualified electronic signature.
But another interesting provision has been added to
the Code by the addition of a sentence to article 32(1)
by article 14 of the Dlgs 159/2006. Article 32(1) now
reads:
‘1. Il titolare del certificato di firma è tenuto ad
assicurare la custodia del dispositivo di firma e ad
adottare tutte le misure organizzative e tecniche
idonee ad evitare danno ad altri; è altresì tenuto ad
utilizzare personalmente il dispositivo di firma.’
‘1. The owner of the signature certificate is required
to ensure the custody of the signature creation
device and to take all necessary organizational and
technical measures capable of preventing damage to
others; he is also required to personally use the
signature creation device.’
The implications of article 32(1) mean that a person can
no longer entrust their smart card and the related
activating PIN to a person they trust to enable him or
her to act on behalf of the card holder, even if the card
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holder cannot use the card themselves (perhaps
because they are frail or physically incapable of using a
smart card) and bear the consequences for what the
trustee does with their smart card on their behalf. For
example, the chief accountant of Telecom Italia cannot
entrust a signing creation device bearing his own private
key to the ITC operator in charge of issuing electronic
invoices that must be signed in accordance with
European Directive 2001/115/EC:8 each single operator
have to be issued a signing certificate, and will be
necessary to issue the invoices with their own Qualified
Signature (Italian legislation requires electronic
invoices, when signed, to be signed with a Qualified
Electronic Signature: Decreto del 23 gennaio 2004
Modalità di assolvimento degli obblighi fiscali relativi ai
documenti informatici ed alla loro riproduzione in
diversi tipi di supporto (G.U. n. 27 del 3 febbraio 2004 n.
27) (Decree by the Minister of Economy and Finance
DMEF 23/1/2004).
A number of further changes have been introduced,
such as the provisions of article 32(3)(j), that require the
certification authority to keep all the information
relating to a qualified certificate for at least twenty
years from the date it was issued. Furthermore, article
25 of the new Code, provides for a public officer to
attest by electronic means that an electronic signature
has been issued in their presence. The article reads as
follows:
‘25. Firma autenticata.
1. Si ha per riconosciuta, ai sensi dell’articolo 2703
del codice civile, la firma digitale o altro tipo di
firma elettronica qualificata autenticata dal notaio
o da altro pubblico ufficiale a ciò autorizzato.
2. L’autenticazione della firma digitale o di altro tipo
di firma elettronica qualificata consiste
nell’attestazione, da parte del pubblico ufficiale,
che la firma è stata apposta in sua presenza dal
titolare, previo accertamento della sua identità
personale, della validità del certificato elettronico
utilizzato e del fatto che il documento sottoscritto
non è in contrasto con l’ordinamento giuridico.
3. L’apposizione della firma digitale o di altro tipo di
firma elettronica qualificata da parte del pubblico
ufficiale ha l’efficacia di cui all’articolo 24, 
comma 2.
4. Se al documento informatico autenticato deve
essere allegato altro documento formato in
originale su altro tipo di supporto, il pubblico
ufficiale può allegare copia informatica autenticata
dell’originale, secondo le disposizioni dell’articolo
23, comma 5.’
‘25. Authenticated signature.
1. It is recognized, in accordance with Article 2703 of
the Civil Code, if the digital signature or other type
of qualified electronic signature is certified by a
notary or other authorized public official.
2. The authentication of digital signatures or other
qualified electronic signature consists of the
attestation by the public official that the signature
was affixed in his presence by the owner after
assessing his personal identity, of the validity of
an electronic certificate used and the fact that the
document signed is not contrary to the legal
system.
3. The affixing of the digital signature or other type of
qualified electronic signature by the public official
has the effectiveness of Article 24, paragraph 2.
4. To be authenticated, the document must be
attached to a document in original format on
another kind, the public official can attach to the
data an authenticated electronic copy of the
original, in accordance with the provisions of
Article 23, paragraph 5.’
The provisions of this article raise the bar for would-be
attackers trying to compromise a private key or to
compel the signatory to subscribe to an offer they
cannot refuse. When authenticating the electronic
signature, the public officer is required to ascertain if
the signing party is the owner of the certificate, thus
preventing certain attacks that are describe in the next
paragraph, and whether the person has signed the
document freely.
Establishing the credentials of the signing party
When using a digital signature, the Certification
Authority (CA) maintains Certificate Revocation Lists
(CRL), used to post details of certificates that have been
revoked for some reason. There is another mechanism
8 Council Directive 2001/115/EC of 20 December 2001
amending Directive 77/388/EEC with a view to
simplifying, modernising and harmonising the
conditions laid down for invoicing in respect of
value added tax, OJ L 15, 17.1.2002, pp. 24–28.
33
COMMENTS ON THE ITALIAN ‘CODE FOR THE DIGITAL ADMINISTRATION’
© Pario Communications Limited, 2008                                www.deaeslr.org Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 5
that can be used for the same purpose. This is provided
by a trusted service provider. The trusted service
provider offers to provide relevant information about a
specific certificate. The recipient of a message signed
with a digital signature can make a request to a trusted
service provider to provide them with the status of the
certificate. Where such a request is made, the trusted
service provider replies with a response such as ‘good,
no good, do not know’, using the Online Certificate
Status Protocol (OCSP) defined in IETF RFC 2560.
Unfortunately, this is easier to explain than execute, for
a number of reasons that cannot be covered in this
article, because they are too technical and require a
detailed explanation. It is for this reason that the Italian
legislation, whilst not forbidding the use of OCSP,
explicitly requires that CRLs must be used, and that any
information provided by the OCSP must be consistent
with the information provided by a CRL.
Anatomy of an attack
A Certification Authority should issue a Certificate
Revocation List at defined intervals. The interval will
differ as between Certification Authorities, but a 12 hour
interval is not inconceivable. Every CRL specifies what is
technically called the ‘nextUpdate’, that is, the time at
which a new CRL will be issued. A CA might issue
‘extemporary’ CRLs,9 which may be issued at any time,
and these can become subject to the ‘man in the
middle’ attack. Assume an attacker (Alice) is interested
in compromising the signing private key of an individual
(Bob), so to cause another person (Carol) to rely on an
error. The sequence would be:
Alice gets ready to compromise Bob’s signing private
key quickly (there may be several methods: a PIN of a
smart card can be captured via micro-cameras as
occurs at times near an ATM machine).
Alice stores a CRL soon after it is issued.
Alice compromises Bob’s key.
Alice produces a fake document with Bob’s
compromised key and sends it to the victim (Carol).
The CA issues an contemporaneous CRL, perhaps
one hour after the previous CRL.
When Carol tries to download the current CRL to
verify if Bob’s certificate is valid, Alice intercepts this
request and sends back to Carol the previously
stored CRL, where the certificate at issue is obviously
not listed.
Carol would see that the CRL has not yet expired,
since the time specified in the nextUpdate has not
passed, and would trust it. The attack would then
succeed.
A crucial issue is that the recipient should always verify
the certificate and thereby become a relying party,10 and
when they verify the certificate, the method they use to
verify it. One question is whether they should wait until
a CRL is issued after the time the document was signed,
or at least after the time the document was received,
and assume that this CRL is reliable. If this course of
action is taken, then the usefulness of an extemporary
CRL is debatable. The real issue is to assess the actual
risk, which in turn depends on how important the
consequences of a successful attack might be.
Converting paper documents to digital documents
The provisions of article 23 are of interest, since they
clarify when a notary or a similar public officer is
required to validate a conversion from paper to digital
format by scanning: validation using a digital signature
or other qualified electronic signature is necessary
when the analogue document is considered to be a
‘unique original’. The technical rules currently in force in
this regard, are set out in Deliberazione CNIPA n.
11/2004 del 19 febbraio 200411 (Deliberation No 11 of
2004 by the Italian National Centre of IT in the Public
Administration (CNIPA)) which provides, in article
1(1)(c):
‘documento analogico originale: documento
analogico che puo’ essere unico oppure non unico se,
in questo secondo caso, sia possibile risalire al suo
contenuto attraverso altre scritture o documenti di
cui sia obbligatoria la conservazione, anche se in
possesso di terzi;’
‘analogue original document: an analogue document
can be unique, or not unique if it is possible to
retrieve the content through other writings or
9 The word ‘contemporaneous’ CRL is used by some
people, somewhat erroneously.
10 Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law,
(Tottel, 2nd edn, 2007), 12.2.
11 G.U. 9 marzo 2004, n. 57.
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documents that must be conserved, even if they are
in possession of third parties.’
Requirements placed on Certification Service
Providers 
All administrators and legal representatives of
Certification Service Providers (CSP) established in Italy,
even those that do not issue qualified certificates, must
abide by the same ‘honourableness’ rules that apply to
similar officers in the banking world, as provided in
article 26(1) of the Code:
‘L’attività dei certificatori stabiliti in Italia o in un altro
Stato membro dell’Unione europea è libera e non
necessita di autorizzazione preventiva. Detti
certificatori o, se persone giuridiche, i loro legali
rappresentanti ed i soggetti preposti
all’amministrazione, devono possedere i requisiti di
onorabilità richiesti ai soggetti che svolgono funzioni
di amministrazione, direzione e controllo presso le
banche di cui all’articolo 26 del testo unico delle
leggi in material bancaria e creditizia, di cui al
decreto legislativo 1° settembre 1993, n. 385, e
successive modificazioni.’
‘The activities of certification service providers
established in Italy or in another EU Member State is
free and does not require prior authorization. Such
certification service providers or, if legal persons,
their legal representatives and those responsible for
their administration, must meet the requirements of
honourableness required of persons who perform
administrative functions, direction and control at the
banks under Article 26 of the single text laws in
material banking and credit, of Legislative Decree 1
September 1993, No 385, and subsequent
amendments.’
This requirement gives a remarkable standing, and
responsibility, to CSPs, even to those that do not issue
qualified certificates.
The requirements are even more stringent for CSPs
seeking accreditation in accordance with the provisions
of article 3(2) of Directive 1999/93/EC: the CSP auditors
must also comply with the ‘honourableness’ rules, and
the company’s capital must be at least equal to the
minimum required for banks (article 29(3)). All the other
Directive 1999/93/EC requirements on CSPs issuing
qualified certificates are met, nor it could be differently,
but a few of them deserve some attention:
no copy of any signatory’s private key can be kept by
the CSP; (Art 32(3)(f))
the CSPs can be requested to revoke a certificate that
has been issued, not only upon the lawful request of
the owner of the certificate, but also when the
request comes from an authorized party, such as the
person upon whose authorization the certificate was
issued, or a legal authority; certificates are also to be
revoked when the CSP becomes aware of certain
objective conditions that require revocation, such as
the subscriber’s disabilities or misbehaviour,
independently of any request by the owner or by any
authorized entity; (Art 32(3)(g))
the CSPs do not need prior authorisation to operate
(Art 26(1)), but, since they are subject to supervision,
in accordance with Directive 1999/93/EC article 3(3),
they must inform CNIPA, the supervisory body, before
starting their operations (Art 27(3));12 should it
transpire that do not abide by the rules, CNIPA has
the power to stop their operations and to require
revocation of the certificates that have been issued,
although it can grant a period of grace to the
certification service provider to resolve the
shortcomings, where applicable.
Requirements placed on public administrations
Public administrations (article 34) that wish to issue
certificates to be used by their own employees in their
official relationships with external entities, be they
citizens, companies or even other public
administrations, have to meet very specific
requirements. Public administrations can only issue
qualified certificates, and they must achieve
accreditation in accordance with Directive 1999/93/EC
article 3(2). The rationale for imposing such conditions
rests with the fact that public administrations are
required to make use of what is considered to be the
‘best of breed’ certificates. However, it is important to
understand that these requirements complement the
provisions set out in article 65(1) that, briefly, requires
documents submitted by citizens to public
administrations to be digitally signed; alternatively, they
can be submitted over the internet, provided that the
person submitting the document is identified by using
their Electronic Identity Card (CIE) or National Services
Card (CNS).
12 The CNIPA is the accreditation body, and keeps a
list of accredited Certification Service Providers.
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It is possible to suggest that these provisions may
limit the free circulation of goods and services within
the European Union.13 However, it can be argued, given
the objective standing of a public administration, that a
Member State can and should provide appropriate
security measures, including cyber-measures, to protect
its public administrations and therefore the state, as
explicitly allowed by article 3(7) of Directive
1999/93/EC. On the other hand, given the increasing
number of accreditation schemes being implemented in
the EU Member States, this is more a theoretical than
an actual hindrance to free competition.
Article 34 also enables a public administration to
issue certificates to external entities (other
administrations, citizens, companies), although these
certificates can only be used between the person or
legal entity with a certificate and the administration that
issued the certificate. A public administration can agree
that a commercial CSP issues the certificates on its
behalf, provided the latter has been accredited in
accordance with article 3(2) of Directive 1999/93/EC.
Public administrations are encouraged to make use of
commercial CSPs, because another specific rule of law
(DPR 445/2000, art. 64(1)) requires them to assess the
cost and benefits each time they intend to implement
any new IT procedure, although for the same reason,
public administrations can adopt, for their internal use,
any solution they choose, without any limit (article
34(2)).
By 1 January 2008, all public administrations must be
equipped with procedures and software applications
suitable to verify digital signatures, as set out in article
34(5):
‘Entro ventiquattro mesi dalla data di entrata in
vigore del presente codice le pubbliche
amministrazioni devono dotarsi di idonee procedure
informatiche e strumenti software per la verifica delle
firme digitali secondo quanto previsto dalle regole
tecniche di cui all’articolo 71.’
‘Within twenty-four months from the date of entry
into force of this code, the public administrations
must have adequate procedures and software tools
for the verification of digital signatures as set out in
the technical requirements laid down in Article 71.’
The technical requirements will be specified in technical
decrees to be issued at a later date. Unfortunately, the
Code does not provide any sanctions for administrations
that do not provide such services, but this would have
been impolitic. Moreover, there are also the provisions
of article 40(1), that ‘Public administrations that have
adequate technological resources …..’, which means the
politicians have toned down the provisions, because a
provision had in fact been in force in the Italian
legislation since March 1998 (Regolamento attuativo
DPR 513/97, (G.U. n° 60 13/3/1998) (DPR No 513 of 10
November 1997, published in the Official Journal on
13/3/1998), (Articles 20 and subsequent ones) that
bound all public administration to adopt the electronic
signature, but without success.
Adopting the signature
Article 35 of the Code mandates that any secure
signature creation device and procedure used to issue
an electronic signature (without any distinction) must
enable the document to be submitted to the signer’s
examination before the signature is generated, except
where an automatic signing procedure is in use. In the
latter case, however, this procedure must be activated
upon the explicit instructions of the signing party, and
their will is to be made evident for each automatically
signed document, as provided in article 35(3):
‘Il secondo periodo del comma 2 non si applica alle
firme apposte con procedura automatica.
L’apposizione di firme con procedura automatica è
valida se l’attivazione della procedura medesima è
chiaramente riconducibile alla volontà del titolare e
lo stesso renda palese la sua adozione in relazione al
singolo documento firmato automaticamente.’
‘The second sentence of paragraph 2 shall not apply
with signatures affixed by an automatic procedure.
The affixing of signatures by an automatic procedure
is valid if the same procedure is clearly attributable
to the will of the owner and the same as to reveal its
adoption in relation to each single document signed
automatically.’
This provision of the Italian Code appears to be
reasonable and practical, especially when an
organization needs to sign a batch of invoices, by way of
example. However, the requirement that the signing
procedure must be activated upon the explicit act of will
13 Jos Dumortier, Stefan Kelm, Hans Nilsson, Georgia
Skouma and Patrick Van Eecke The legal and
market aspects of electronic signatures; Stefan
Kelm, ‘On the implementation of the 1999
European Directive on electronic signatures’,
Digital Evidence and Signature Law Review, 2
(2005) 7 - 15.
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by the signer is, it seems, tantamount to giving the
signer responsibility for each signature in any event.
Secure signature-creation devices
Requirements are provided for in article 35 in respect of
secure signature-creation devices (SSCDs) and
procedures used to issue electronic signatures, as
specified in Annex III of Directive 1999/93/EC. Moreover,
article 35(4), (5) and (6) require that the SSCDs used to
issue Qualified Electronic Signatures must be certified
as meeting the requirements set out in Annex III of
Directive 1999/93/EC by national bodies of the
European Union Member States. Member States must
notify the European Commission and other Member
States of the names of their respective national bodies.
This is not a problem for smart cards and similar
devices. 
There is some doubt about Hardware Security
Modules (HSM), which are high performance hardware
signing devices used by Certification Authorities, Time
Stamping Authorities and others. It is difficult to see
how HSM manufacturers will commit to spending a
remarkable amount of money (in the order of magnitude
of some hundred thousand euros) to achieve
certification for a device that would only sell in very
small quantities. If such devices are sold in such limited
numbers, it has to be wondered what their resale cost
will be. This could be a real hindrance to the diffusion of
digital signatures.14
Storage of digital documents
Articles 42, 43 and 44 refer to the storage of digital
documents. The term ‘storage’ is a useful term, but is
can also mean ‘archive’. However, it is necessary to
make a distinction between what can be termed an
‘operational’ archive, for the purpose of making
documents immediately retrievable by many persons
simultaneously, and ‘conservation’ storage for the
purposes of auditing, possibly for many years. In fact
they have different requirements.
Operational storage
The basic requirement of an ‘operational’ archive is to
enable the fast retrieval of documents by many people
simultaneously, to facilitate daily operational
requirements; the security measures need only be
sufficient to ensure the documents are not lost or
altered by accident: there is no need to grant them legal
validity.
Conservation storage 
The purpose of ‘conservation’ storage is to ensure in the
long term that the digital document is the ‘original’
document, or an exact copy of the paper document; the
length of time taken to retrieve the document is less
important: the aim is to is support auditors in fulfilling
their duties. It is only an added bonus if it is possible to
achieve dynamic and multiple access for this form of
storage.
The Code addresses the second type of storage, and it
is remarkable that another law already in force, the
Deliberazione CNIPA n. 11/2004, specifically addresses
this subject by laying down the technical and
organisational rules on how this is to be implemented.
The main provisions are as follows:
There are no additional requirements to the storage
of electronic documents signed with an electronic
signature (article 3).
Analogue documents (paper, microfilm) can be stored
electronically under the sole responsibility of the
organisation (article 4(1)).
The only exceptions are what are termed ‘unique’
analogue documents, that is, analogue documents of
which no copy exists and the content of which cannot
be derived from other existing documents. The
storage of these unique analogue documents
requires an additional qualified signature by a public
officer (notary, public administration official, and the
like), asserting that the stored object accurately
represent the analogue original (article 4(2)).
When the storage media is closed, a qualified
electronic signature is to be issued by the person
appointed by the organisation performing the
storage and, where the cases of the previous items
occur, by a public officer, plus a Time Stamp Token
(articles 3(1), 4(1), 4(2)). 
No additional mechanism or procedure is required,
although organisations are free to adopt additional
measures. In fact, the validity of the storage must be
guaranteed by the organisation’s security measures.
This is an important point, since it makes clear that
the security of the storage measures in place rely on
the organisation’s structure and procedures, and that
additional technical measures are just an additional
14 The author agrees with the comments by Stefan
Kelm in relation to this issue, ‘On the
implementation of the 1999 European Directive on
electronic signatures’, Digital Evidence and
Electronic Signature Law Review.
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feature, not an essential element (article 8). 
With respect to the acts of notaries, article 39 of the
Code provides that all documents that must be retained,
including notary acts, can be kept in electronic format,
provided that they meet the requirements specified in
relevant technical Decrees:
‘I libri, i repertori e le scritture, ivi compresi quelli
previsti dalla legge sull’ordinamento del notariato e
degli archivi notarili, di cui sia obbligatoria la tenuta
possono essere formati e conservati su supporti
informatici in conformità alle disposizioni del
presente codice e secondo le regole tecniche stabilite
ai sensi dell’articolo 71.’
‘The books, directories and books, including those
provided by law upon the Notaries and notarial
archives, which are mandatory to retain can be
formed and stored electronically in accordance with
the provisions of this Code and in accordance with
the technical rules established under Article 71.’
On a final note, while in a number of other jurisdictions
detailed requirements are provided relating to the
media documents in digital format can be stored, Italy
has adopted a pragmatic approach to the issue, as set
out in article 6(1) of Deliberazione CNIPA n. 11/2004,
which states:
‘1. Il documento conservato deve essere reso
leggibile in qualunque momento presso il sistema
di conservazione sostitutiva e disponibile, a
richiesta, su supporto cartaceo.’
‘1. The document that is stored must be made legible
at any time at the place of conservation and must
be made available, upon request, on paper.’
It is simple: the organisation must exhibit the
document, and if it is not able to, then it will incur any
sanctions provided for by the relevant legislation. The
organization does not have the excuse that it adopted
the relevant hardware and software as required by law,
and it is not their fault that the document cannot be
retrieved. In Italy, it is for the organisation to ensure
they can exhibit the document.
Posta Elettronica Certificata 
Registered e-mail is a further facility that is addressed
in article 48, by specifying the Posta Elettronica
Certificata (PEC), that means precisely “registered e-
mail”. The organisational requirements of the PEC are
set out in the Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 11
febbraio 2005, n.68 “Regolamento recante disposizioni
per l’utilizzo della posta elettronica certificata, a norma
dell’articolo 27 della legge 16 gennaio 2003, n. 3. (G.U.
28 marzo 2005, n. 97)” (Decree by the President of the
Republic No 68 of 11 February 2005 (Gazzetta Ufficiale
No 97 of 28 March 2005)), specifically mentioned by the
Code, while the technical requirements are set out in an
additional, specific Presidenza Del Consiglio Dei
Ministri, Dipartimento Per L’Innovazione e Le
Technologie Decreto 2 novembre 2005 Regole tecniche
per la formazione, la trasmissione e la validazione,
anche temporale, della posta elettronica certificata (tutti
i requisiti tecnico-funzionali che devono essere rispettati
dalle piattaforme utilizzate per erogare il servizio) (G.U.
del 15 novembre 2005, n. 266) (Decree by the President
of the Counsel of Ministers issued on 2 November 2005
(Gazzetta Ufficiale No 266 of 15 November 2005)).
The purpose of PEC is to apply the mechanisms of the
ordinary paper registered mail to e-mail, with the
additional requirement that users must register
themselves at their own PEC provider.
When sending an e-mail using the PEC, the sender is
electronically authenticated and is provided with a
receipt signed by the PEC provider; this receipt states
that the provider accepted a certain e-mail at a certain
moment from the specific sender. Moreover, since the
recipient’s server is supposed to be able to reliably
identify who the actual recipient is that has rightful
access to the relevant mail box, the sender will also be
provided with a receipt stating that a certain e-mail was
deposited in the correct recipient’s mail box at a certain
moment in time. This provides the sender with a means
to lawfully uphold an assertion that, effective at a
certain moment, an e-mail was available in the mailbox
for the intended recipient, or for an authorized delegate.
The sender is not at fault if the recipient fails to open
the mailbox to open the e-mail. An interesting aspect of
the receipt, is that it bears the entire e-mail that was
sent, unless otherwise required by the sender. This
provides a great advantage over the postal mail,
because in the latter case a recipient can claim that they
received the envelope by registered mail, but the
envelope did not contain anything.
The service does not extend to inform the sender if
the e-mail was opened. Similarly, PEC does not address
confidentiality or authenticity of the documents sent: it
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is for the sender to decide to encrypt, or to encrypt and
sign the document.
In particular, article 47(2), provides that
communications between public administrations can be
carried out by e-mail, provided their origin is verified. It
is also provided that the origin of the e-mail can be
ascertained when a digital signature or a qualified
electronic signature is used; when the Protocollo
Informatico keeps track of the e-mails; in any other case
where it is possible to ascertain the origin of the e-mail,
and when PEC is used. All public administrations were
required set up a PEC mail box from 1 September 2006
(Art. 47(3) of the Code).
Electronic identity and authentication cards 
Italy is one of the countries where identity cards have
been in force for a very long time. In 1999, Italy began
planning the introduction of an Electronic Identity Card,
called Carta d’Identità Elettronica. Given the complexity
of the project, there have been a number of pilot phases
and such like, and the legal, organisational and
technical aspects have been addressed by a number of
laws and decrees.
Now, article 66 of the Code addresses the two types
of identity or authentication cards: the ‘Electronic
Identity Card’ (CIE) and the ‘National Services Card’
(CNS). In summary, the CIE is a smart card that purports
to meet two requirements: face to face identification
and on-line authentication. The CIE is produced by the
Italian Mint.15
The reader will note that, in addition to the usual data
and photograph of the purported holder of the card, an
optical memory band is present on the rear. The
purpose of this optical band is to implement security
measures suitable to prevent counterfeiting by
modifying the data. On the left part of the optical
memory band, there is an embedded hologram, which is
created when the card is prepared for the individual,
that reproduces the document number and the
photograph of the holder of the document that is
printed in colour on the front of the card. This feature,
like the hologram, is visible under a specific light
source. The chip has the usual function of an
authentication card: it has a signing capability that is
supported by an authentication certificate issued by the
Ministry of the Interior. This means that the issuing of a
CIE certificate is controlled by the relevant Ministry
service, the Sistema di Sicurezza per il Circuito di
Emissione (Issuing Circuit Security System). As of March
2007, in accordance with the official CIE site, the
Municipalities involved in issuing the CIE totalled 3
million, out of population of almost 57 million.
In the effort to speed up ‘e-Democracy’, the Carta
Nazionale dei Servizi (CNS) (National Services Card) was
launched, after years of tests and efforts to achieve
interoperability. On 2 March 2004 the President of the
Republic signed a Decree16 that set out the regulations
for issuing the CNS. This was followed on 9 December
2004 by a joint Decree by the Minister of the Interior,
the Minister of Economy and Finance and the Minister
for Innovation and Technology, published in the
Gazzetta Ufficiale No 296 of 18 December 2004,17
providing security and technical rules related to the
technologies and the materials to be used to produce
the CNS. The National Services Card (CNS) is a smart
card intended as a means of on-line  authentication.
Since it does not have the purpose of serving as a face
to face identity document, it only has a microchip with
similar characteristics to those of the CIE. The CNS does
not have a photograph of the holder and has no specific
requirements on the card, thus paving the way to
enable it to be issued at a faster rate. Moreover, the CNS
can be issued by any public administration that acquires
the relevant authentication certificates from any
accredited certification service provider. This does not
mean that the CNS is accepted only by the issuing
administration: rather, it must be accepted by any
administration, thus speeding up the means of on-line
authentication.
There are some interesting problems surrounding the
validity of the process of confirming the identity of the
person to whom a card is issued. Article 65(1) of the
Code provides as follows:
‘1. Le istanze e le dichiarazioni presentate alle
pubbliche amministrazioni per via telematica ai
sensi dell’articolo 38, commi 1 e 3, del decreto del
Presidente della Repubblica 28 dicembre 2000, n.
445, sono valide:
a. se sottoscritte mediante la firma digitale, il cui
certificato è rilasciato da un certificatore
accreditato;
15 Istituto Poligrafico Zecca dello Stato (IPZS), an
image of the card is available on-line at
http://www.ipzs.it/scheda_sicurezza_CI_eng.jsp.
16 Decreto Del Presidente Della Repubblica 2 marzo
2004, n. 117 Regolamento concernente la
diffusione della carta nazionale dei servizi, a
norma dell'articolo 27, comma 8, lettera b), della L.
16 gennaio 2003, n. 3. (G.U. 6 maggio 2004, n.
105) (Decree by the President of the Republic 2
March 2004, No 117 Regulations regarding the
national services card diffusion, as per article 27,
paragraph 8, letter b), of law 16 January 2003, No 3
(Gazzetta Ufficiale No 105 of 6 May 2004)).
17 Decreto 9 dicembre 2004 del Ministro dell’interno,
del Ministro per l’innovazione e le tecnologie e del
Ministro dell’economia e finanze (avviso in G.U. 18
dicembre 2004, n. 296 ), Le regole tecniche e di
sicurezza relative alle tecnologie e ai materiali
utilizzati per la produzione della Carta nazionale
dei servizi.
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b. ovvero, quando l’autore è identificato dal sistema
informatico con l’uso della carta d’identità
elettronica o della carta nazionale dei servizi, nei
limiti di quanto stabilito da ciascuna
amministrazione ai sensi della normative vigente;
c. ovvero quando l’autore è identificato dal sistema
informatico con i diversi strumenti di cui
all’articolo 64, comma 2, nei limiti di quanto
stabilito da ciascuna amministrazione ai sensi
della normativa vigente e fermo restando il
disposto dell’articolo 64, comma 3.’
‘1. Claims and statements submitted to the
government electronically in accordance with
Article 38, paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Decree of the
President of the Republic on December 28, 2000,
n. 445 are valid:
a. if signed by a digital signature, whose certificate is
issued by an accredited certificate authority;
b. or, when the author is identified by the computer
system with the use of an electronic identity card
or national card services to the extent determined
by each administration in accordance with
regulations in force;
c. or when the author is identified by the computer
system with the different instruments referred to
in Article 64, paragraph 2, to the extent
determined by each administration to law and
without prejudice to the provisions of Article 64,
paragraph 3.’
The provisions of article 65(1)(a) are straightforward,
but the provisions of 65(1)(b) and 65(1)(c) pose some
difficulty. Article 65(1)(b) enables an electronic
document that is not signed to be valid, provided that
the identity of the person submitting the document or
claim is verified. Some questions that arise from this
sub-section include what ‘valid’ means, and the period
of time the validity lasts. For instance, an official in a
public administration may have verified the identity of
the person submitting the document or claim, but it
cannot be guaranteed that the document that is
submitted will never be modified by anyone. Should the
document be modified, it is debatable whether the
document will still be valid. The provisions in items (b)
and (c) are open to criticism. At best, all that can be
asserted is the authenticity of the person performing
the submission (assuming, for the sake of argument,
that the person using the password is the person to
whom the card has been issued), not of the document
that is submitted.
It is suggested that this criticism is reinforced by the
provisions of article 65(2), which provide as follows:
‘Le istanze e le dichiarazioni inviate o compilate su
sito secondo le modalità previste dal comma 1 sono
equivalenti alle istanze e alle dichiarazioni
sottoscritte con firma autografa apposta in presenza
del dipendente addetto al procedimento; resta salva
la facoltà della pubblica amministrazione di stabilire i
casi in cui è necessaria la sottoscrizione mediante la
firma digitale.’
‘applications and declarations submitted in the
manner provided for in paragraph 1 shall be
equivalent to the demands and declarations signed
with signature affixed in the presence of the
employee assigned to the proceedings; the faculty of
public administration may determine when a
subscription is required by the use of a digital
signature.’
It is interesting to note that this requirement was
already present in Decreto legislativo 23 gennaio 2002,
n. 10 Attuazione della direttiva 1999/93/CE relativa ad
un quadro comunitario per le firme elettroniche (G.U. n.
39 del 15 febbraio 2002) (Legislative Decree No
10/2002), which was repealed when the Code came into
force on 1 January 2006.
Enforceability 
The Code extends the enforceability of previous
technical decrees, based on previous rules of law, until
new ones, as required by the Code, come into force. The
Code itself became effective 1 January 2006, and the
changes applied as a result of the Dlgs 159/2006 did
not affect this validity date.
© Franco Ruggirei, 2008
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